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Can Netanyahu rise to the occasion?

Binyamin NetanyahuDuring the Oslo years of the 1990s, one of the more justified critiques of the Israeli right was that Yasser Arafat and his aides were doing far too little to prepare Palestinian public opinion for the gut-wrenching compromises that peace would entail.

So I was disappointed, though not exactly surprised, that before their plane back to Israel even hit the tarmac at Ben-Gurion Airport, members of Prime Minister Netanyahu's entourage were already trashing the Obama administration's emerging peace initiative.  In doing so, of course, they were hurting the chance for peace, while weakening Israel's greatest strategic asset - American friendship.

One unidentified "senior figure" in the Prime Minister's company called the two-state solution, "stupid".  Another termed it "juvenile" (or "infantile", depending on one's translation of the Hebrew "yalduti").

Lest we forget: The two-state solution is the cornerstone of the entire Middle East peace process and remains at the heart of the Obama administration's diplomatic approach.

But as if this weren't enough, another senior member of the Netanyahu government, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, then offered up this rebuff to the American (and international) attitude on Israel's expansion into the West Bank via civilian settlement. Responding to the all-but-universally-held belief that settlements undermine the peace effort, Lieberman asked ("bewilderedly", as YNet put it): "Why is Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria [considered an] obstacle for peace?"

Lest we forget (again), here's how Secretary of State Hillary Clinton clearly expressed US policy on settlement earlier this week, in an interview with Al-Jazeera:  "First, we want to see a stop to settlement construction - additions, natural growth, any kind of settlement activity - that is what the president has called for."

Perhaps, of course, all this Israeli posturing is nothing more than "locker-room talk", a show of superficial bravado meant to impress and titillate Netanyahu's right-wing allies and supporters.  Or perhaps all this anti-peace process rhetoric is meant for more general domestic consumption, to reinforce the notion that Mr. Netanyahu can take the heat, stand up to international pressures and drive the best bargain possible for Israel.

Even if we forget, for the moment, that - as they accused Arafat - Netanyahu and his backers seem to be doing far too little to prepare Israeli public opinion for the gut-wrenching compromises that peace would entail, there is also a far worse possibility: That Netanyahu & Co. are still motivated by the "Greater Land of Israel" philosophy and, given the choice, would prefer settlements and control of Judea and Samaria (a.k.a., the West Bank) to a two-state solution based on the '67 borders and Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and Palestine.

The consistent stream of hard-line Israeli statements in the immediate aftermath of this week's US-Israel summit makes it harder to believe that this is all just negotiating tactics.  Here are another few examples, all from the four days since Barack met Bibi:

One would like to believe that we are seeing evidence of hard political bargaining.  But it's notable and worrisome that the post-summit statements from the Israeli government seem to be stressing Israel's exclusive territorial claims, rather than the nation's legitimate security concerns.  On the question of whether Netanyahu remains a Herut ideologue or has become a seasoned pragmatist, the jury is therefore still out.

Back in 1999, when Ehud Barak (then still a darling of the peace camp) was campaigning against the incumbent Prime Minister Netanyahu, one of Barak's central themes was that, although Bibi was a master tactician, he was an amateur when it came to grand strategy.  (Barak was one to know: He was Netanyahu's superior in the IDF's General Staff Reconnaissance commando unit.)

Netanyahu is, indeed, a skilled diplomat, who uses words artfully to walk between the raindrops.  Just this week, he parried calls for a two-state solution by invoking his rival formula of "Palestinian self-government" (Netanyahu-speak for Palestinian autonomy sans territorial contiguity). 

And he neatly sidestepped expectations that Israel resume the diplomatic process presided over by Mr. Olmert by enthusiastically offering to "negotiate without preconditions" (a euphemism, of course, meant to free him from the bargaining positions taken by his predecessors).

But with real storm-clouds gathering on Israel's horizon - the prospect of a hostile, nuclear Iran, the possible closing of the window on a two-state peace, the deterioration of Israel's international standing, to name but a few - let us hope that Netanyahu will aim higher than the limited goal of getting through a DC trip and back to Jerusalem in one piece.  

Let us hope that Mr. Netanyahu has grown over the years and that, in his second go-round as Prime Minister, he will prove himself neither Greater Israel disciple nor merely Israel's most gifted PR specialist.

With Israel's future at stake, let us hope that Mr. Netanyahu will "rise to the occasion" - as President Obama put it this week - and devote all his talent to one thing, and one thing only: Israel's true, long-term strategic interest.

Ron Skolnik
Executive Director