Guide to the Perplexed – The Annapolis Peace Conference

A must-read for any one who wants to understand the issues surrounding the upcoming peace conference!

Prepared by Ron Skolnik, Assistant Director, and the Staff of Meretz USA

During an address on the Middle East on July 16, US President George Bush issued a call for, “an international meeting … of representatives from nations that support a two-state solution” between Israel and Palestine. Bush’s announcement has produced a whirlwind of diplomatic activity, the likes of which have not been seen since the heady days of Camp David and Taba at the end of the Clinton Presidency. The print and electronic media have similarly been awash with countless stories that seek to stay abreast of the latest developments.

In the face of such an information overload, the following “Guide to the Perplexed” was conceived as a way of zeroing in on the key players and central questions pertinent to the upcoming conference, which is scheduled to take place later this fall. Cutting through the public posturing, disinformation and diplomatic fog that are part and parcel of any Middle Eastern negotiation, this “Guide” will help distinguish between what we know for sure and the various rumors that are circulating in both the press and blogosphere.

Where?
When?
Who are the Players?
What are the Issues?
Time-Frame for Negotiations
What are the Risks?

Where?

The conference will apparently take place at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.

When?

No final date has yet been set for the conference. Latest reports talk of November 26th, or December 1st , or even later. The original tentative date for the conference was November 15, but this date will probably not be feasible, due to the prolonged Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over a joint “declaration of principles”.

Who are the players?

Israel: The Israeli government is treading carefully, in part due to the conflicting approaches of its many factions. Some in Israel’s government are warning Prime Minister Olmert not to make too many concessions to the Palestinians. Labor Party Chairman and Defense Minister Ehud Barak has dismissed the conference as “hot air” and seems more interested in staging a major Israeli military strike against Hamas in Gaza. Olmert, himself, seems interested in reaching a general, vague, non-committal joint statement with the Palestinians, while postponing more serious, detailed talks until a later time. He has also indicated that such negotiations could not proceed until the Palestinian government dismantled the Palestinian terrorist organizations.
Palestine: In practice, the Palestinian government is currently divided between
Palestinian Authority-West Bank (Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah) and Palestinian Authority-Gaza Strip (Hamas).
- West Bank/Fatah: Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad, based in the West Bank, support the conference and are engaged in talks with the Israeli government for the drafting of a joint statement ahead of the gathering. However, even the moderate Palestinian leaders will find it hard to accept a document that breaks no new ground – especially when their participation at the conference is being depicted by their rivals, Hamas, as an abandonment of the Palestinian cause. The weak Abbas and Fayyad cannot afford to be seen as allowing Israel to ride roughshod over them. As a result, their spokespersons have issued threats to boycott the conference if insufficient progress is made.
- Gaza Strip/Hamas: Hamas, which maintains de facto control of the Gaza Strip under deposed Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, has attacked Abbas and Fayyad for “surrendering” to Israel, and has called on the Arab states to boycott the conference. Hamas itself has been excluded from the conference due to its unwillingness to formally recognize Israel and renounce violence. There is a growing suspicion in Israel that, as the date for the conference draws nearer, Hamas will seek to derail the diplomatic process via terrorist attacks. The aim of such attacks would be to draw Israel into a Gaza invasion that could undermine the conference (see Israel/Barak above) or, at very least, to create an atmosphere that would not allow Israel to make significant diplomatic concessions.
- Palestinian unity? Intermittent reports continue to surface regarding a possible Fatah-Hamas rapprochement. Most of these reports have been generated by Hamas leaders, who have suggested resurrecting the Hamas-Fatah unity government. Relations between the parties collapsed following Hamas’ rout of Fatah forces in Gaza in June 2007, and Abbas’ resultant dismissal of the Hamas-led Cabinet. While Fatah officials have paid lip service to the need for Palestinian unity, they have publicly rejected talks with Hamas as long as Hamas maintains control of the Gaza Strip. Olmert has warned Abbas that a renewed Fatah-Hamas unity government would cause Israel to suspend diplomatic contacts.
USA: Although it was President Bush who called for the conference, and though the US will host the parley, the American administration has been repeatedly criticized for its continued lackadaisical treatment of the peace process. Sources in the Arab world, Israel and within the Administration have bemoaned the fact that the US has not taken a dynamic leadership role, and are concerned that this could result in the conference’s failure. Secretary of State Rice will return to the Mideast in mid-October to try to nudge the two parties along.
Saudi Arabia: A Saudi role at the conference would be a major step forward for the peace process, since Saudi Arabia has no diplomatic relations with Israel, and has generally maintained an important but behind-the-scenes diplomatic role. The Saudi monarchy has given no firm indication as to whether it will attend the conference, though. The recent announcement of a major US weapons deal with Riyadh was reportedly part of a quid pro quo designed to secure Saudi participation. However, other reports suggest that the Saudis will not take the plunge unless they’re assured that the conference will involve significant Israeli concessions. It has been hinted, for example, that neither the Saudis, nor any of the Arab states, would attend the Annapolis conference if there is no freeze on Israeli settlement activity.
Syria: A Syrian role at the conference is considered important, since an excluded Syria would have both the motive and the ability to undermine the peace process, either by direct action or through its proxies. The US has backtracked from its policy of isolating Syria, inviting Damascus to the conference in its role as a member of the Arab League committee handling the Arab League peace initiative. Syrian President Assad has countered that his country would take part only if the conference deals with the occupied Golan Heights as well. Israel has welcomed Syrian participation, but Ehud Olmert has rejected the idea of tackling the Golan issue at Annapolis.
Jordan & Egypt: These two countries, which have peace agreements with Israel, have indicated their readiness to take part in the conference. However, they have suggested that they will be represented only at the level of foreign minister (rather than prime minister or Head of State) – or might not attend at all – if the conference does not produce any significant movement towards peace.
Others: According to reports, among the other representatives at the conference will be the EU, other members of the Arab League and three non-Arab Muslim countries – Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia.

What are the Issues

A declaration of what? Several months ago, the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships resolved to reach an agreed joint document ahead of the conference. However, the hopes for this document have been consistently downgraded over the course of time: Original thoughts of hammering out a highly-detailed “framework agreement” gave way to an effort to reach a so-called “declaration of principles”. However, due to Israeli reticence (see Israel above), the document under consideration is now even less ambitious, being termed a “declaration of interests” by Olmert. Israel would like to see the more serious negotiations postponed until after the conference. The Palestinians, on the other hand, want to pack as many details as possible into the document in order to justify their attendance of the conference.
Settlements: The Palestinians are demanding an immediate freeze on construction in Israel’s West Bank settlements, along with the evacuation of the wildcat outposts, as well as several government-supported settlements. Israel has made no specific commitments on this issue. In previous years, it has committed to evacuating the outposts, but has failed to implement this commitment, primarily due to domestic political constraints. In the past, it had agreed to halt settlement construction only after the Palestinian terrorist organizations were disarmed and disbanded. Under a final-status deal, Israel would likely be prepared to dismantle outlying settlements, while seeking to annex those lying close to the Green Line.
Borders: The Palestinians want the declaration to state that the future border will be based on the 1967 lines. They are prepared for an exchange of territory with Israel, but want to limit this to 2%-3% of the West Bank in order to prevent the West Bank’s “cantonization”. Israel is willing to relinquish the majority of the West Bank, but has made no specific proposal as to future borders, preferring to defer this question to future negotiations. Unofficially, some Israeli leaders have indicated that they want a border based on the route of the separation barrier, encompassing 6%-8% of the West Bank, and including the majority of the settler population; it has been suggested
that Israel would cede in exchange a roughly equal amount of its sovereign territory.
Safe Passage: The Palestinians seek to have sovereignty over a “safe passage” corridor that would link the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Due to security concerns, Israel has historically objected to full Palestinian sovereignty over this corridor. Greater flexibility has been noted of late, with unofficial reports that this corridor might be the land ceded in exchange for parts of the West Bank.
Refugees: The Palestinians want Israel to recognize its responsibility for the suffering of the Palestinian refugees and to compensate them. Although they have not surrendered their claim for a “right of return” for all Palestinian refugees, press reports indicate that such a concession would be possible. Almost the entire Jewish population of Israel rejects the “right of return”, regarding it as equivalent to a call for Israel’s destruction. Israel would be willing to see Palestinian refugees “return” to a future Palestinian state, and reports indicate that Olmert might consider token refugee return to sovereign Israel under the heading of “family reunification”.
Jerusalem: The Palestinians want to see East Jerusalem, including the Old City, as the capital of the Palestinian state and under full Palestinian sovereignty. Reports indicate that they are willing to have the joint declaration state more generally that East Jerusalem will be the capital of Palestine and west Jerusalem the capital of Israel. On the Israeli side, Vice Prime Minister, Haim Ramon, has been leading the effort to prepare Israeli public opinion for significant concessions on Jerusalem. Ramon’s plan, which Olmert has not rejected, calls for relinquishing most of the Palestinian Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem. Less clear are his plans for the Old City and the holy places, including the Temple Mount. A few reports suggest willingness for some concessions on the Old City, in addition to vague “special arrangements” for the holy sites. One report even suggests that Jordan would be given guardianship over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. Support for Ramon’s ideas seems to be gradually gaining ground among Israeli political leaders.
Immediate issues: Aside from these final-status issues, the Palestinians are pressing to make gains in several areas of immediate concern. Among the measures they are seeking from Israel are: The dismantling of wildcat outposts, a declaration of a settlement freeze, the release of additional Palestinian prisoners, and the removal of a significant number of checkpoints/roadblocks within the West Bank. Should the Palestinian negotiating team score achievements on these issues, it would go a long way toward bolstering the credibility of Abbas and Fayyad.

Time-Frame for Negotiations:

Whereas the Palestinian Authority has demanded that negotiations over a final-status agreement be concluded within the 6 months following the conference, Israel has insisted that no deadlines or timelines be created.

What are the risks?

Following the inflated hopes produced by the run-up to the conference, deep disappointment and frustration are certain to result should the Annapolis meet prove a bust.

In Israel: Over the past few months, the Israeli political arena has gradually been emerging from the deep pessimism that has gripped it since the failure of peace talks in 2000. Another failed go at diplomacy would certainly convince many in Israel that the conflict can never be resolved. Many Israelis would resign themselves to the occupation as a necessary evil, while others would regard the breakdown of talks as a green light for harsh military measures, such as a large-scale invasion of Gaza.
In Palestine: Failure would almost certainly mean gains for Hamas and other extremists, since the Palestinians would come away convinced that even moderates such as Abbas and Fayyad are unable to soften the Israeli position and end the occupation; as support for diplomacy takes another hit, the idea of violent resistance would gain even more credence.
In the US: A failed Annapolis conference would almost certainly be the death knell for proactive American engagement in Israel-Palestine – at least for the duration of the Bush era. At best, Bush’s Administration would limit itself to a policy of conflict management (as opposed to conflict resolution), designed to keep the situation from spiraling out of control; at worst, Bush would lead a policy of diplomatic laissez-faire, which Israel would take as “carte blanche” for whatever military measures it wished to take.
Elsewhere in the region: The Arab League would likely disengage from its Saudi-led peace initiative and begin to search for a new approach; Syria might conclude that the diplomatic route for recovering the Golan Heights is blocked, and turn toward military action to break the impasse (though a renaissance of Syrian-Israeli contacts to fill the diplomatic vacuum is also conceivable). An extremist Iran would likely find itself with even greater popular support, both within Palestine and around the Arab world.

Addendum:

The Israeli government elected on October 26th to begin cutting the fuel and electricity supply to Gaza in response to the shelling of Israeli villages by Palestinian militants. To read Meretz USA's statement on the decision, please click her e.