Outgoing Meretz MK Abu Vilan: Netanyahu-Obama friction almost inevitable

Opening on a personal note, MK Vilan noted that, as of February 24, he would no longer be a Knesset Member, since the Meretz party would have only three seats in the new Knesset, and he had been ranked number six on the party list. Vilan noted that he would continue with his effort to promote the One Home initiative for bringing West Bank settlers back to Israel.

MK Vilan first analyzed the results of Israel's February 10 elections, including the setback suffered by both Meretz and Labor. Pointing to the trend shown by the public opinion polls, he reported that the balance between Israel's right-religious bloc and its center-left bloc (65 vs. 55 seats) had been essentially stable - before the Gaza War, during the war, and after it as well. On the other hand, the election campaign saw major shifts within each of these blocs.

Vilan indicated that, in the last weeks of the campaign, the leaders of the two largest parties - Tzipi Livni of Kadima and Binyamin Netanyahu of Likud - had coordinated their strategy, in an effort by each party to grow at the expense of its natural allies. This strategy worked, he said: In the final run-up to the election, Kadima rose by seven seats at the expense of Labor and Meretz. Likud rose at the expense of Yisrael Beiteinu, whose Knesset result of 15 seats was much less than the polls' prediction of 20.

MK Vilan expressed frustration that much of Kadima's gain was a result of its misrepresentation of the Israeli political system: Kadima told Meretz and Labor supporters that the biggest single party would form the next government. Too many Israelis, he said, do not understand their own system of government and were taken in by this claim: In the country's multi-party system, the party that leads the government is the one with the best chance of cobbling together a coalition.

But with Israel's center-left desperate to stop Netanyahu from becoming Prime Minister, and with Livni enjoying much more free media exposure than both the Labor and Meretz leaders, Kadima's message had a "tsunami effect" as the campaign neared its end.

In reality, Vilan explained, Kadima never had a chance to form the next coalition government: If Livni could not form one in September and October from a much stronger position, she was certainly not going to do so with a weakened center-left. Furthermore, Livni had lost any chance of support from the predominantly Arab parties (which now hold 11 seats, combined), after Kadima had backed the disqualification of two Arab parties in the weeks before the elections. (Only Meretz, he noted, had opposed this anti-democratic move, which was later struck down by Israel's High Court.)

Focusing on the setback suffered by Meretz, Vilan noted that, prior to the war, the party had picked up momentum due to its alliance with the New Movement group, which included leading literati such as Amos Oz, David Grossman and A.B. Yehoshua. The party was polling at 8 seats until the Gaza war, which knocked it back to 5. But the post-war campaign, he said, had brought the party back to 7 seats in the polls, before Kadima's effective stratagem to pull over Meretz voters. Vilan noted that Meretz had also lost approximately 5,000 Jewish sector votes to the predominantly Arab Hadash party.

Vilan was also saddened that Livni's use of the "feminist card" had been so effective with liberal voters, since Kadima was no feminist party, and Meretz MK Zehava Galon had been the only true campaigner for women's rights in the Knesset.

Looking towards the next Israeli government, MK Vilan maintained that the only two realistic scenarios were a narrow right-wing coalition with 65 MKs; and a "national unity" government based on Likud and Kadima, with one or more other parties.

Vilan predicted dire consequences for Kadima under either scenario: Should Kadima go to the Opposition, it would implode, he ventured, since the party was a coalition of politicians who had nothing in common but the desire to govern. If Kadima stayed out of the coalition, he continued, the Likud would soon bring about the defection of many of the former Likudniks who had helped form Kadima four years ago. This, he believed, would cause Kadima to break apart.

On the other hand, should Kadima enter a Likud-led government, it would be following the self-destructive pattern of the Labor Party. Still, he acknowledged the problem of leaving Israel to a purely right-wing pro-settlement government. Under present circumstances, this might be too risky for the country, since a "South Africa syndrome", with growing calls for sanctions, might follow.

Moving on to the broader international picture, Vilan asserted that the US will play a key role in the months ahead. President Obama, he pointed out, is seeking to withdraw from Iraq and unfreeze ties with Iran. In both areas, Vilan said, the US will need Arab world support, and will likely try to attain it through an Israeli settlement freeze.

But for Israeli right-wingers, such a proposition is a non-starter. And although a Likud-Kadima government might be more amenable, Vilan pointed out that the Likud is today a much more right-wing party than it was before, its new Knesset list dominated by its more radical elements.

A more feasible alternative for American policy would therefore be starting on the Israeli-Syrian track, which has always been more palatable for Israel, and offers the country more strategic gains - disconnecting Syria from Hezbollah and Hamas. But, Vilan noted sadly, Netanyahu had repeatedly declared during the campaign that he would offer no compromise on the Golan Heights either!

MK Vilan summarized by saying that a Netanyahu government will not be able to survive if the US is serious about peace efforts. Inevitable friction with Washington would produce new elections in another 18 months to 2 years.

Vilan sharply criticized the decisions made (or avoided) by the Israeli government over the last few years: Israel had done almost nothing to strengthen Fatah and President Mahmoud Abbas, for example. Instead of releasing Marwan Barghouti as a gesture to the pro-peace Palestinian President, there were now rumors that Barghouti would be released as part of a prisoner exchange involving Gilad Shalit. Woefully, this would serve as another feather in Hamas' cap.

The Gaza war, too, had ended up strengthening Hamas, which had actually been losing support prior to the "Cast Lead" operation. But with Gaza seeing 10% of its buildings destroyed by Israel, and with 850 civilian fatalities out of a total of 1,300, Hamas' showing in Palestinian public opinion polls has again soared.

Looking ahead, Vilan indicated that not all is lost for the Israeli center-left, but that the moment has come to organize differently. He pointed out that 70% of Israelis still want a two-state solution, but that only 30% define themselves as left-of-center. The other 40% want "someone else" to bring about the two-state agreement.

Vilan hinted that the parties representing the 30% should lay aside past differences and create a new alternative. This new grouping would include the Labor Party and Meretz, as well as the many small parties whose votes had gone to waste because they received less than the 2% minimum to enter Knesset - the party of former Labor MK, Ephraim Sneh, the Green Movement-Meimad list, the Greens, and the Green Leaf party (which seeks to legalize cannabis use).

Vilan bemoaned the fact that, according to exit polls, these parties, in total, had received the support of 70,000 left-of-center voters. If these votes had gone to either Meretz or Labor, it would have meant 3 more Knesset seats for the two parties.

Vilan left with a promise that, although no longer an MK, he would be happy to continue briefing Meretz USA audiences in the future.