Reflecting on the Fatah convention

For the first time in its 50-year history, the Palestinian Fatah party - the party of Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, and the dominant party in the PLO - has officially adopted the principle of a two-state solution.

Holding its first convention since 1989, before the inception of the Oslo process, Fatah decided in Bethlehem earlier this month that its goal is the creation of a State of Palestine alongside a sovereign State of Israel in the pre-1967 borders. (The umbrella PLO had already made such a decision, years ago.)

So why isn't the Israeli government applauding - especially after Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu begrudgingly adopted a watered-down two-state formula back in June?

Israel's chief diplomat, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, was quick out of the gate earlier this week, nipping hopes for progress in the bud. In an official Foreign Ministry communiqué, Lieberman categorically declared that the Fatah convention, "buries any possibility to reach a comprehensive settlement with the Palestinians in the next few years."

Here in the US, the right-wing "Zionist Organization of America" has, for several years, been lobbying the administration and Congress to sever relations with Fatah (including with Palestinian President Abbas) - using the argument that the party's constitution had never been updated to recognize Israel. The explicit decision by Fatah this month has not placated the ZOA, though, which rushed to term the party's convention, "a mockery of peace".

Clearly, neither Lieberman nor the ZOA are inclined to agree with Haaretz, which, without viewing the Fatah gathering through rose-colored glasses, editorialized that, "Israel does have a Palestinian partner," for peace.

It will, of course, require much more careful - and professional - analysis to fully understand the import of Fatah's many resolutions. No official text has been released in English, allowing undocumented rumor-mongering to abound, amplified by the unbridled ease of digital communications.

Nonetheless, according to some media reports, a few Fatah resolutions might reflect a hardening of the Palestinian negotiating position.

A reported resolution on Jerusalem, for example, in which Fatah demands "all of" the city - including its western portion - would (if accurate) be a regrettable step backwards from the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Notwithstanding Mr. Netanyahu's symmetrical demand to keep all of Jerusalem under Israeli control, such a decision would in no way further the chances for peace. Nonetheless, other reports suggest that Fatah referred explicitly to East Jerusalem at its convention.

Much has also been made of Fatah's insistence on retaining the right of "resistance" to occupation. But while the ZOA triumphantly cites this as "proof" of the organization's commitment to terrorism, Palestinian affairs expert Avi Issacharoff explains that the new Fatah constitution actually marginalizes the once central focus on armed struggle. He adds that, in Palestinian discourse, the word for "resistance" can suggest either violent or non-violent means, while reporting that President Abbas stressed the non-violent aspect in his opening convention address. "Proof", one might say, is in the eye of the beholder.

Finally, the Fatah convention has been criticized for not recognizing Israel "as a Jewish state" - a precondition recently tossed into the diplomatic mix by Prime Minister Netanyahu. In an interview with Haaretz today, the widely respected Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad - not a Fatah member - addresses the issue:

"The character of Israel ... is Israel's own choice. It characterizes itself in the way that it wishes to characterize itself. Why raise it now? Why would you want to settle it now when we haven't settled anything else? Needless to say, however which way Israel decides to characterize itself ... is [up to] Israel."

Truth be told, an important political event never takes place in only one dimension: It is always an unstable, overlapping combination of personal rivalry, domestic politics, and foreign relations.

Fatah's recent convention was no different. The competition for senior leadership positions between the "Old Guard" and the "Next Generation", for example, was just as important as any other issue - as The Media Line news agency lays out in a helpful analysis of internal party politics.

Unfortunately, truth is much too nuanced to make good text for the frenzied copywriter in search of a hyperbolic headline. Rather than rush to summary conclusions, those who truly care about Israel should heed the advice offered by Haaretz: To study the Fatah resolutions seriously and carefully.

Ron Skolnik
Executive Director